


Germany's new local lockdown is a warning, not a disaster

June 26 2020, by Adam Kleczkowski




Data downloaded on June 26th, 2020. Credit: [Adam Kleczkowski \(data from Johns Hopkins University\)](#)

German authorities have had to take the difficult decision of [reimposing a pandemic lockdown](#) in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia after a resurgence of the coronavirus. This comes after the country's R number,

a measure of how quickly new cases of the disease are emerging, [almost tripled](#) over the course of few days.

Germany has been [widely praised](#) for [its response to the pandemic](#). It has had [far fewer deaths](#) than most similar sized [western countries](#), its national lockdown [was relaxed](#) after just six weeks, and new cases recently reached a low of [about 500 a day](#) in a country of more than 80 million.


Daily new cases of COVID-19 (seven-day average)



Data downloaded on June 26th, 2020. Credit: [Adam Kleczkowski \(data from Johns Hopkins University\)](#)

So does the big increase in the R number and the reintroduction of lockdown at a local level suggest something has gone wrong in the country's strategy? In reality it may be related to how R is calculated and its limits as a measure of the spread of disease. But it also signals the risks that remain even as many other countries end their lockdowns.


Alarm bells first sounded in mid-June, when more than 1,500 workers at a meat-processing factory in Gütersloh in North Rhine-Westphalia [tested positive](#). More cases were found in the broader area, including in neighbouring counties.



Data downloaded on June 26th, 2020. Credit: [Adam Kleczkowski \(data from Johns Hopkins University\)](#), Author provided

This localised [outbreak](#) has had a disproportionate effect on the country's overall R (reproductive) number. [R represents](#) the average number of people who catch the virus from an infected person. When R is bigger than 1 it means the number of cases are increasing.

During the mid-June Gütersloh outbreak, R [jumped from the value of about 1 to almost 3](#) before [falling back to below 1](#). But, such values of R need to be carefully interpreted.



Data downloaded on June 26th, 2020. Credit: [Adam Kleczkowski \(data from from Robert Koch Institute\)](#), Author provided

There are different methods that can be used to calculate R. The one

[used in Germany](#) is based on the total number of known infected individuals in the whole country. It essentially compares the number of new cases on a given day with those four-to-seven days earlier.

If 500 new cases were noted seven days before the Gütersloh outbreak of 1,500 new cases, R will be equal to 3. This means each person with the virus has infected, on average, three others.

But, this number hides substantial [potential variation in different locations](#). While in most of the country, the numbers of new cases may have continued to fall, one or only a few people in Gütersloh could have triggered an outbreak on a scale of around 1,500. Such large and localised outbreaks are called super-spreading events.

It's too early to speculate on exactly what caused the June outbreak and whether it started with one or more people. But with a continuous supply of both infected and susceptible individuals in a population which is still far away from herd immunity, the disease is likely to spread when the conditions are right.

The nature of [meat processing factories](#) may have been a factor. Cold temperatures can combine with busy workplace conditions, intensive labour, and a noisy environment encouraging [shouting](#), which can spread the virus. Other localised outbreaks have also been linked to meat factories in a variety of [countries](#).

Lessons for the future

In many countries, COVID-19 cases are generally falling to low numbers. This means any substantial but localised outbreak will cause the R number to increase temporarily.

But this does signal an increased risk of a more sustained spread. In the

"first wave" of COVID-19, a single person caused an outbreak in a ski resort of Ischgl that arguably led to a rapid increase in cases across Europe [including in Germany](#).

The risk of a new superspreading event contributing to a "second wave" requires [quick and decisive action](#). So it's essential that such events are [managed by appropriate control measures](#), including [renewed lockdowns](#). Since lockdown decisions imply huge economic costs, they need to be supported by predictions based on epidemiological models.

While the role of socio-economic versus medical factors in the Gütersloh outbreak needs to be discussed, we still need to consider [pro-active measures](#) to prevent such outbreaks. Until a vaccine is successfully deployed, government and the public need to get used to living with the virus and continuing to act to stop it spreading again.

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